

**EXHIBIT B Continued - PART 4**  
**END**

VERIFICATION

)  
)  
STATE OF CALIFORNIA )

)  
)  
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO )  
)  
)

I have read the foregoing RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION, SET ONE,  
PROPOUNDED BY DEFENDANTS, JOHNSON & JOHNSON, et al., and know of its contents.

I am a party to this action. The matters stated in the foregoing document are true of my own knowledge except as to those matters which are stated on information and belief, and as to those matters I believe them to be true.

Executed on 2/9, 2007, at Vale, North Carolina

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Diana L. Gaines (Mother & GAL)  
Type or Print Name

Diana L. Gaines  
Signature

Gary D. Gaines (Father & GAL)  
Type or Print Name

Gary D. Gaines  
Signature

PROOF OF SERVICE  
(C.C.P. 1013A, 2015.5)

**STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

I am employed in the county of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 100 Wilshire Boulevard, 21st Floor, Santa Monica, California 90401.

On February 9, 2007 I served the foregoing document, described as Plaintiffs' Response to Requests for Admission, Set One on the interested parties in this action

\_\_\_ by placing the true copies thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as stated on the attached mailing list.

X by placing X the original \_\_\_ a true copy enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as follows:

Charles F. Preuss, Esq.  
DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP  
50 Fremont St., 20<sup>th</sup> Floor  
San Francisco, CA 94105-2235  
(415) 591-7500

X BY MAIL.

\_\_\_ I deposited such envelope in the mail at Santa Monica, California. The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid.

X As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. postal service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Santa Monica, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

Executed on February 9, 2007 at Santa Monica, California.

\_\_\_ BY PERSONAL SERVICE. I delivered such envelope by hand to the offices of the addressee.

\_\_\_ BY FACSIMILE. I faxed a copy of the above-described document to the interested parties as set forth [above/on the attached mailing list].

Executed on February 9, 2007 at Santa Monica, California.

X (State) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Linda Shaffer  
Name

  
Signature

PROOF OF SERVICE  
(C.C.P. 1013A, 2015.5)

**STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

I am employed in the county of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 100 Wilshire Boulevard, 21st Floor, Santa Monica, California 90401.

On April 24, 2007, I served the foregoing document, described as

**PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY  
AND CROSS MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM ANY ALLEGED WAIVER OF  
OBJECTIONS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION  
OF MICHAEL J. AVENATTI; DECLARATION OF LINDA SHAFFER; EXHIBITS**

on the interested parties in this action

\_\_\_ by placing the true copies thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as stated on the attached mailing list.

X by placing \_\_\_ the original X a true copy enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as follows:

\_\_\_ **BY MAIL.**

\_\_\_ I deposited such envelope in the mail at Santa Monica, California. The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid.

\_\_\_ As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. postal service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Santa Monica, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

Executed on April 24, 2007, at Santa Monica, California.

\_\_\_ **BY PERSONAL SERVICE.** I delivered such envelope by hand to the offices of the addressee.

\_\_\_ **BY FACSIMILE.** I faxed a copy of the above-described document to the interested parties as set forth [above/on the attached mailing list].

Executed on April 24, 2007 at Santa Monica, California.

X **BY FEDERAL EXPRESS (PRIORITY OVERNIGHT).** I caused to be deposited such envelope in the Federal Express Depository at Santa Monica, California.

Executed on April 24, 2007 at Santa Monica, California.

X (State) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Robert Gersten  
Name

  
Signature

SERVICE LIST  
*GAINES v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON*  
San Francisco Superior Case No. CGC 06 457600

**BY FEDERAL EXPRESS**

Charles E. Preuss, Esq.  
Thomas W. Pulliam, Jr., Esq.  
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RECEIVED

APR 25 2007

DRINKER BIDDLE  
& REATH LLP

Attorneys for Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

THOMAS B. GAINES, etc., et al,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. CGC -06-457600

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO  
DEFENDANT JOHNSON &  
JOHNSON'S SEPARATE  
STATEMENT OF ITEMS IN DISPUTE  
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO  
COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES

[Filed Concurrently with Plaintiffs'  
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to  
Compel]

Date: May 7, 2007  
Time: 10:30 a.m.  
Place: Department 610  
Judge: Commissioner Bruce E. Chan

Complaint Filed: November 3, 2006

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1020, Plaintiffs hereby submit this  
Response to Defendant JOHNSON & JOHNSON'S Separate Statement of Discovery Items in Dispute  
in Support of its Motion to Compel Further Responses.

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I.

**PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE**

**DEFENDANT'S POSITION:** Plaintiffs did not serve signed and verified response to Defendant's First Set of Special Interrogatories as required by C.C.P. § 2030.250(a), (c). The Court should issue an order compelling Plaintiffs to do so.

**PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE:** Plaintiffs timely served signed and verified responses to the requested discovery on February 9, 2007. Defendants have chosen to ignore the fact that they were mailed Exhibits 2-5, and instead focus on the fact that as a courtesy, Plaintiffs also e-mailed a copy of the discovery on February 12, 2007. E-mail service is not proper service under CCP § 1013, and e-mailing discovery responses on February 12, 2007 certainly does not invalidate responses that were sent out on February 9, 2007 via mail and according to code.

**Special Interrogatory No. 12:**

Set forth all facts upon which YOU rely for YOUR contention that MCKESSON is a proper party to this lawsuit.

(For purposes of this set of interrogatories, "MCKESSON" means McKesson Corporation and any subsidiary or division thereof.)

**Plaintiffs' Response to Special Interrogatory No. 12:**

Objection: This interrogatory seeks plaintiffs' counsel's work product, legal reasoning, theory, and/or statutory basis supporting a factual contention.

Without waiving this objection, plaintiffs state that MCKESSON was and is the distributor of CHILDREN'S MOTRIN to WAL-MART.

Discovery is ongoing and plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement this response.

**Defendant's Reasons to Compel Further Response to Special Interrogatory No. 12:**

Plaintiffs' objections to Special Interrogatory number 12 are waived because Plaintiffs did not serve timely discovery responses. (Declaration of Benjamin J. Holl ("*Holl Dec.*"), at 4-5 and Ex. K; C.C.P. § 2030.290(a)). Plaintiffs must disclose the purported work-product that relates to why they



1 believe McKesson is a proper party to this lawsuit. *Id.*; *Leach v. Superior Court* (1980) 111  
2 Cal.App.3d 902, 905-906.

3 Substantively, Plaintiffs' response to this Interrogatory is conclusory, evasive, and  
4 incomplete. Plaintiffs contend in their Complaint that McKesson is a proper party to this lawsuit based  
5 on its alleged distribution and sale of Children's Motrin. (*See Holl Dec.*, Ex. A at ¶¶ 9). Defendant  
6 is entitled to learn facts upon which Plaintiffs base the contentions in their Complaint. *See, e.g., Sheets*  
7 *v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County* (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 1, 8-9 ("there is no doubt that a  
8 defendant is entitled to discover by appropriate interrogatories the facts, if any, presently known to the  
9 plaintiff upon which he bases the allegations of his complaint and upon which he presently relies to  
10 prove his case"); *Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ.* (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d  
11 1, 37, citing *Singer v. Superior Court* (1960) 54 Cal.2d 318 ("it is perfectly proper for a party to  
12 submit an interrogatory requiring his adversary to specify, under oath, the facts on which he relies in  
13 support of a particular contention or allegation made in a pleading").

14 Defendant needs the requested information to assess the claim that McKesson is a proper  
15 party to this lawsuit, and whether this case is removable to federal court. The only basis for this case  
16 being before this Court is McKesson's status as a defendant. Plaintiffs assert in the Complaint that  
17 Children's Motrin is distributed "throughout the United States through various distributors, including  
18 but not limited to McKesson . . ." (*see Holl Dec.* Ex. A. at ¶9), but refuse to disclose any facts or  
19 evidence in support of their contention that McKesson distributed the Children's Motrin at issue in this  
20 case, and thus why McKesson is a proper party to this lawsuit and this case should remain in this  
21 Court. Plaintiffs instead simply reiterate their bare conclusion that "McKesson was and is the  
22 distributor of Children's Motrin to Wal-Mart." (*See, e.g., Holl Dec.* Ex. G at response number 12.)

23 Plaintiffs must provide all facts upon which they "rely for [their] contention" that McKesson  
24 is a proper party to this lawsuit. The bare assertion that McKesson "was and is" the distributor of  
25 Children's Motrin is wholly insufficient. A "party may not provide deftly worded conclusory  
26 answers designed to evade a series of explicit questions."

27 *Deyo v. Kilbourne* (1978) 84 Cal. App. 3d 771, 783.  
28



1 The Court should issue an order compelling Plaintiffs to furnish Defendant with a full,  
2 complete and substantive response to this Interrogatory.

3 **Reason Why a Further Response Should Not Be Compelled:**

4 As discussed above, the responses were timely therefore Plaintiffs' objections have not been  
5 waived. The discovery response is proper. Wal-Mart and McKesson are both Defendants in this  
6 matter. They both share the same counsel. Plaintiffs' discovery response indicates that Plaintiff  
7 believes that McKesson is a proper party to the lawsuit because it distributes Children's Motrin (the  
8 drug that killed Plaintiff Thomas Gaines) to Wal-Mart, where it was purchased by Plaintiffs' parents.  
9 The response puts counsel for both Wal-Mart and McKesson on notice that Plaintiff intends to argue  
10 that McKesson is part of the distribution chain that lead the defective product from Defendants to  
11 McNeil. Furthermore, Plaintiff has also provided Defense counsel with articles indicating that  
12 McKesson is the primary supplier of Wal-Mart's pharmaceuticals, (See Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs'  
13 Opposition).

14 The interrogatory is worded that it only seeks why Plaintiff named McKesson as a party to  
15 this lawsuit. Plaintiff provided the answer, Defendant McKesson is part of the chain of distribution.  
16 Plaintiff complied with the interrogatory and provided additional information.

17 Essentially all requests for discovery suffer from the same basic problem. They do not ask  
18 merely for documents or evidence, they ask for Plaintiffs' counsel to disclose: (a) which documents  
19 and evidence Plaintiffs' counsel believes support Plaintiffs' contentions or allegations, (b) Plaintiffs'  
20 counsel's valuation of which evidence is important and which evidence is not important, and/or (c)  
21 which pieces of evidence Plaintiffs plan to utilize at trial. Asking for the information to be produced  
22 in such a manner is designed to elicit the mental impressions and work product of Plaintiffs' counsel.  
23 It is not enough that Defendants are seeking information, but they also want Plaintiffs' counsel to  
24 provide Defendants with a break down whether such information are important to Plaintiff, whether  
25 Plaintiffs' counsel plans to use such information to support their claims, and how Plaintiffs' counsel  
26 plans to use such information. Such interrogatories are not about obtaining information likely to lead  
27 to admissible evidence, but rather represent an attempt by Defense counsel to get a look at Plaintiffs'

28

1 counsel's "play book." There is nothing relevant or likely to be relevant about what Plaintiffs' counsel  
2 thinks of the information Defendants seek to obtain.

3 It is a violation of the public policy set forth in California *Code of Civil Procedure* section  
4 2018.020 for Plaintiff to identify information Plaintiffs' counsel has gathered that relate to the issues  
5 in the case. California *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2018.020 provides:

6 It is the policy of the state to do both of the following:

- 7 (a) Preserve the rights of attorneys to prepare cases for trial with that degree of  
8 privacy necessary to encourage them to prepare their cases thoroughly and to  
9 investigate not only the favorable but the unfavorable aspects of those cases.  
(b) Prevent attorneys from taking undue advantage of their adversary's industry and  
efforts.

10 Defendant's are seeking materials and information that plaintiffs' counsel have gathered  
11 using their own industry and efforts to support their clients' claims. Some of the requested  
12 information is equally available to defendants, especially those requests that ask plaintiffs' counsel  
13 to identify and produce documents in defendant's own files. ( for example, evidence of sales between  
14 McKesson and Wal-Mart). As will be demonstrated below, these interrogatories seek to obtain the  
15 thoughts and impressions of plaintiffs' counsel and the fruit of plaintiffs' counsel's labor, all in  
16 violation of the public policy set forth in California *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2018.020.  
17 Therefore, plaintiffs cannot be forced to identify or provide the requested information and materials  
18 that their attorneys have gathered.

19 Code of Civil Procedure, Section 2018.030, provides: "Any writing that reflects an attorney's  
20 impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories, shall not be discoverable under any  
21 circumstances." The issue before this Court is whether the requested documents and information  
22 consist of attorney work product. "The statute, however, does not define 'work product'. Thus, the  
23 determination of what work product is must be resolved by individual court determinations on a case  
24 by case basis." (*City of Long Beach v. Superior Court* (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 65, 71.) What an  
25 attorney has learned or thinks is important in preparing the case is totally outside of the scope and  
26 objectives of legitimate discovery. The Supreme Court in *Hickman v. Taylor* (1947) 329 U.S. 495,  
27 511 recognized that a lawyer in preparing the client's case, assembles information, sifts through what  
28 the lawyer considers to be relevant facts, prepares legal theories and plans strategy. This work is

1 reflected in tangible and intangible ways and is called work product. (*Id.*; see *In re Jeanette H.* (1990)  
 2 225 Cal.App.3d 25, 32.) The Court explained the policy reasons for the attorney work product  
 3 privilege:

4 Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is  
 5 now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts,  
 6 heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp  
 7 practices would inevitable develop in the giving of legal advice and in the  
 8 preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be  
 9 demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be  
 10 poorly served. . . . [T]he general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney's  
 11 course of preparation is so well recognized and so essential to an orderly working  
 12 of our system of legal procedure that a burden rests on the one who would invade  
 13 that privacy to establish adequate reasons to justify production. (*Id.* at 511-512  
 14 (emphasis added).)

15 Whether a request that a party identify and produce information and documents that counsel  
 16 believes are relevant to the issues in this case violates the work product rule was addressed in *Nacht*  
 17 & *Lewis Architects, Inc. v Superior Court* (1996) 47 Cal. App. 4th 214 and *City of Long Beach v.*  
 18 *Superior Court* (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 65.

19 In *Nacht & Lewis Architects, Inc., supra*, 47 Cal.App.4th at 217 the trial court granted an  
 20 order requiring the defendant to identify all persons who had been interviewed by the defendant or  
 21 anyone acting on its behalf. The defendant objected to Form Interrogatory No. 12.2, stating that  
 22 interviews had been conducted but identification of the witnesses was protected by the attorney-client  
 23 privilege and work product doctrine. (*Id.*) The Court of Appeal held that requiring the defendant to  
 24 provide a list of witnesses interviewed would violate the absolute work product privilege of Section  
 25 2018(c), now Section 2018.030. (*Id.*) That court held as follows:

26 Compelled production of a list of potential witnesses interviewed by  
 27 opposing counsel would necessarily reflect counsel's evaluation of the case  
 28 by revealing which witnesses or persons who claimed knowledge of the  
 incident (already identified by defendants' response to interrogatory No. 12.1)  
 counsel deemed important enough to interview. (*Id.*)

29 In *City of Long Beach v. Superior Court* (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 65 the plaintiff served  
 30 interrogatories seeking the names and address of non-expert witnesses the defendant intended to call  
 31 at trial and sought the nature of the testimony of each witness. (*Id.* at 69.) The court specifically held  
 32 that requiring the defendant to disclose the identity of the witnesses it intended to call was qualified

1 work product. (*Id.* at 73.) The court further held that the anticipated testimony was absolutely  
 2 privileged as work product. (*Id.* at 80.)

3 Plaintiffs' counsel's selection and/or collection of information that counsel deems important  
 4 to the lawsuit or **"supports his clients' contentions"** is also protected work product. In cases  
 5 involving extensive document discovery, the **selection and compilation** of documents is often more  
 6 crucial than legal research. (*Shelton v. American Motors Corp.*, 805 F.2d 1323 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1986)(citing  
 7 *James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co.*, 93 F.R.D. 138, 144 (D.Del.1982).)) "Even if the individual  
 8 documents sought are not attorney work product, **'the selection process itself represents defense**  
 9 **counsel's mental impressions and legal opinions as to how the evidence in the documents relates**  
 10 **to the issues and defenses in the litigation.'**" (*Smith v. Florida Power & Light Co.*, 632 So. 2d 696,  
 11 698 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)(citing *Sporck v. Peil*, 759 F.2d 312, 315 (3d Cir. 1985).)) The selection  
 12 and compilation of documents by counsel falls within the highly-protected category of opinion  
 13 work product. (*Sporck v. Peil*, 759 F.2d 312, 315 (3d Cir. 1985).) Thus, regardless of the  
 14 jurisdiction, it is clear that in the practice of law, the selection and compilation of documents is  
 15 attorney work product that is not discoverable.

16 In the instant case, the Defendants ask that Plaintiffs' counsel be required to review their files  
 17 and tell defendant which documents plaintiffs' counsel think support Plaintiffs' claim, think are  
 18 important, why Plaintiffs' counsel believes they are important, or that Plaintiffs' counsel might use  
 19 at trial. These interrogatories violate the absolute work product privilege in that they improperly seek  
 20 "an attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories." (C.C.P. §2030.030.)  
 21 An answer to these interrogatories will not clarify Plaintiffs' contentions, provide Defendants with  
 22 facts, or narrow the issues. (*See, e.g. Sheets v. Superior Court* (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 1, 13). Rather,  
 23 these interrogatories are asking Plaintiff to perform qualitative analysis and research for the  
 24 Defendants. (*See Id.*) However, Plaintiffs' counsel's selection, review, understanding, and  
 25 compilation of facts and documents is attorney work product. Any facts and documents that Plaintiffs'  
 26 counsel have gathered have been a result of a number of hours of work. Defendants should not benefit  
 27 from the research that plaintiffs' counsel have done.  
 28

1 In addition, a response to those interrogatories where the Defendants seek treatises,  
 2 periodicals, and publications that Plaintiffs' counsel may have gathered would also reveal Plaintiffs'  
 3 counsels' research. Therefore, pursuant to the attorney work product privilege, plaintiffs cannot and  
 4 should not be compelled to respond to defendant's requests.

5 **Special Interrogatory No. 13:**

6 Describe all EVIDENCE supporting YOUR contention that MCKESSON is a proper party  
 7 to this lawsuit.

8 (For the purposes of this set of interrogatories, "EVIDENCE" means all DOCUMENTS,  
 9 testimony, or statements made from personal knowledge of any potential witness. For the purposes  
 10 of this set of interrogatories, "DOCUMENTS" means written, printed, typed, or visually or orally  
 11 reproduced material of any kind, whether or not privileged, including but not limited to any and all  
 12 letters, correspondence, contracts, agreements, bills, orders, receipts, invoices, statements, records  
 13 [including but not limited to medical records], books, articles, computer tapes and reports, press  
 14 releases, advertising and promotional literature, prints; drawings, plans, photographs, printed forms,  
 15 manuals, brochures, lists, publications, videotapes, or other tape recordings, films, microfilm, and all  
 16 other writings, including drafts, typings, printings, minutes or copies or reproductions thereof in the  
 17 possession, custody, or control of YOU.)

18 **Plaintiffs' Response to Special Interrogatory No. 13:**

19 Objection: This interrogatory seeks plaintiffs counsel's work product, legal reasoning, theory,  
 20 and/or statutory basis supporting a factual contention.

21 Without waiving this objection, plaintiff states that MCKESSON was and is the distributor of  
 22 CHILDREN'S MOTRIN to WAL-MART.

23 Discovery is ongoing and plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement this response.

24 **Defendant's Reasons to Compel Further Response to Special Interrogatory No. 13:**

25 Please see the reasons set forth above with respect to Interrogatory No. 12.

26 **Reason Why a Further Response Should Not Be Compelled:**

27 Please see the reasons set forth above with respect to Interrogatory No. 12. It should also be  
 28 pointed out that Plaintiff also produced to Defendants Exhibit 1, which outlines the extensive



1 marketing agreement between McKesson and Walmart, making McKesson the primary supplier  
 2 pharmaceuticals to Wal-Mart. The fact that McKesson has an agreement to be the primary distributor  
 3 of pharmaceuticals to Wal-Mart is evidence of McKesson's involvement in shipping Children's  
 4 Motrin to Wal-Mart for consumption by the Plaintiff. Plaintiffs have satisfied this interrogatory.

5  
 6 **Special Interrogatory No. 18:**

7 Set forth the facts upon which YOU rely for YOUR contention that the  
 8 CHILDREN'S MOTRIN was sold by MCKESSON.

9 **Plaintiffs' Response to Special Interrogatory No. 18:**

10 Objection: This interrogatory seeks plaintiffs' counsel's work product, legal reasoning, theory,  
 11 and/or statutory basis supporting a factual contention.

12 Without waiving this objection, plaintiffs state that MCKESSON was and is the distributor  
 13 of CHILDREN'S MOTRIN to WAL-MART.

14 Discovery is ongoing and plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement this response.

15 **Defendant's Reasons to Compel Further Response to Special Interrogatory No. 18:**

16 Please see the reasons set forth above with respect to Interrogatory No. 12.

17 **Reason Why a Further Response Should Not Be Compelled:**

18 Please see the reasons set forth above with respect to Interrogatory No. 12. It should also be  
 19 pointed out that Plaintiff also produced to Defendants Exhibit 1, which outlines the extensive  
 20 marketing agreement between McKesson and Walmart, making McKesson the primary supplier  
 21 pharmaceuticals to Wal-Mart. The fact that McKesson has an agreement to be the primary distributor  
 22 of pharmaceuticals to Wal-Mart is evidence of McKesson's involvement in shipping Children's  
 23 Motrin to Wal-Mart for consumption by the Plaintiff. Plaintiffs have satisfied this interrogatory.

24  
 25 **Special Interrogatory No. 19:**

26 Describe all EVIDENCE supporting YOUR contention that the CHILDREN'S MOTRIN was  
 27 sold by MCKESSON.

**Plaintiffs' Response to Special Interrogatory No. 19:**

Objection: This interrogatory seeks plaintiffs' counsel's work product, legal reasoning, theory, and/or statutory basis supporting a factual contention.

Without waiving this objection, plaintiffs state that MCKESSON was and is the distributor of CHILDREN'S MOTRIN to WAL-MART.

Discovery is ongoing and plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement this response.

**Defendant's Reasons to Compel Further Response to Special Interrogatory No. 19:**

Please see the reasons set forth above with respect to Interrogatory No. 12.

**Reason Why a Further Response Should Not Be Compelled:**

Please see the reasons set forth above with respect to Interrogatory No. 12. It should also be pointed out that Plaintiff also produced to Defendants Exhibit 1, which outlines the extensive marketing agreement between McKesson and Walmart, making McKesson the primary supplier of pharmaceuticals to Wal-Mart. The fact that McKesson has an agreement to be the primary distributor of pharmaceuticals to Wal-Mart is evidence of McKesson's involvement in shipping Children's Motrin to Wal-Mart for consumption by the Plaintiff. Plaintiffs have satisfied this interrogatory.

**II.****PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSES TO FIRST REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION**

**DEFENDANT'S POSITION:** Plaintiffs did not serve signed and verified response to Defendant's First Request for Production as required by C.C.P. § 2031.250(a), (c). The Court should issue an order compelling Plaintiffs to do so.

**PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE:** Plaintiffs timely served signed and verified responses to the requested discovery on February 9, 2007. Defendants have chosen to ignore the fact that they were mailed Exhibits 2-5, and instead focus on the fact that as a courtesy Plaintiffs also e-mailed them a copy of the discovery on February 12, 2007. E-mail service is not proper service under CCP § 1013, a and e-mailing discovery responses on February 12, 2007 certainly does not invalidate responses that were sent out on February 9, 2007 via mail and according to code.



**Request for Production No. 3:**

All DOCUMENTS that evidence the distribution of the CHILDREN'S MOTRIN by a DISTRIBUTOR.

(The term "DISTRIBUTOR" is used in these requests as it is used in Paragraph 9 of the COMPLAINT.)

**Plaintiffs' Response to Request for Production No. 3:**

Objection: This request seeks plaintiffs' counsel's work product, legal reasoning, theory, and/or statutory basis supporting a factual contention. Further, all responsive DOCUMENTS should be in the possession, custody or control of Defendants.

**Defendant's Reasons to Compel Further Response to Request for Prod. No. 3:**

Defendant preliminarily notes that, in a good faith effort to avoid this motion to - compel, Defendant re-worded Request No. 3 in its meet and confer-letter to. Plaintiffs as follows:

**Request No. 3:** Please produce all DOCUMENTS in your possession that evidence the distribution of the CHILDREN'S MOTRIN by a DISTRIBUTOR.

Plaintiffs, however, have not responded to Defendant's meet and confer letter or its modified Request for Production number 3. (*Holl Dec.*, at ¶6). In any event, the requested documents are discoverable, and Defendant is entitled to them.

As discussed, Plaintiffs' objections to Defendant's First Request for Production are waived because Plaintiffs did not serve timely responses. (*Holl Dec.*, at ¶¶ 4-5 and Ex. K; C.C.P. § 2031.300(a)).

Moreover, document requests seeking facts or documents relied upon by parties in support of their contentions are commonplace and appropriate. *See, e.g., Burke v. Superior Court* (1969) 71 Cal. 2d 276, 280-281; *Rifkind v. Superior Court* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1260-1261; and cases cited therein. A party is entitled to discovery of the opponent's contentions and their factual and evidentiary bases, notwithstanding the underlying involvement of expert opinion or attorney analysis. *Ibid.*

Plaintiffs' response to Request number 3 is insufficient and frustrates the purpose of discovery. They contend in their Complaint that Children's Motrin was distributed

1 "throughout the United States through various distributors, including but not limited to McKesson .  
 2 . ." (*Holl Dec.*, Ex. A at ¶9). Yet, Plaintiffs refuse to produce any documents that evidence the  
 3 distribution of Children's Motrin by any distributor, let alone McKesson. Defendant is entitled to learn  
 4 what documents Plaintiffs possess, control or have in their custody that relates to this issue. It is  
 5 immaterial that the requested documents may, or may not, be available from other sources, including  
 6 Defendant itself. Plaintiffs must also specify with particularity what responsive documents Plaintiffs  
 7 refer to that in Plaintiffs opinion "should" be in the "possession, custody or control of Defendants."

8 **Reason Why a Further Response Should Not Be Compelled:**

9 The request is grossly overbroad. It asks for Plaintiff to produce all evidence of all  
 10 distribution of all Children's Motrin across the United States. (The request is so broad, Plaintiff would  
 11 have to produce documents from three other Children's Motrin cases that do not involve Wal-Mart  
 12 just to comply with the requests. ) Assuming the request is narrowed down to mean that Plaintiff must  
 13 produce all documents evidencing the chain of distribution between Johnson and Johnson, McKesson,  
 14 and Wal-Mart, Defendants are already in possession of such documents. Plaintiff should not be  
 15 required to produce documents that the parties already have within their possession, custody, and/or  
 16 control.

17 Furthermore, Plaintiff has already produced evidence of a distribution agreement between  
 18 Wal-Mart and McKesson, making McKesson Wal-Mart's primary distributor of pharmaceutical  
 19 products. (*See Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs' Opposition*).

20 The fact that Defendant offers to cure the defective responses in its meet and confer letter is  
 21 immaterial. Though, ordinarily, "it would constitute an abuse of discretion to deny *in toto* a motion  
 22 to compel further answers merely because some of the interrogatories were objectionable," this is not  
 23 the case when all of the interrogatories are objectionable. *Deaile v. General Telephone Co. of*  
 24 *California*, (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 841, 851 (citing *Coy v. Sup. Ct.*, 58 Cal.2d 210, and *West Pico*  
 25 *Furniture Co. v. Sup. Ct.*, 56 Cal.2d 407). In *Deaile*, the court held that because all of the  
 26 interrogatories propounded by Plaintiff were subject to Defendant's proper objection, and since the  
 27 Court is under no obligation to redraft interrogatories so that proper questions are presented, Plaintiffs'  
 28 motion to compel could be denied in its entirety. 40 Cal.App.3d at 851.

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Essentially all requests for discovery suffer from the same basic problem. They do not ask merely for documents or evidence, they ask for Plaintiffs' counsel to disclose: (a) which documents and evidence Plaintiffs' counsel believes support Plaintiffs' contentions or allegations, (b) Plaintiffs' counsel's valuation of which evidence is important and which evidence is not important, and/or (c) which pieces of evidence Plaintiffs plan to utilize at trial. Asking for the information to be produced in such a manner is designed to elicit the mental impressions and work product of Plaintiffs' counsel. It is not enough that Defendants are seeking information, but they also want Plaintiffs' counsel to provide Defendants with a break down whether such information are important to Plaintiff, whether Plaintiffs' counsel plans to use such information to support their claims, and how Plaintiffs' counsel plans to use such information. Such interrogatories are not about obtaining information likely to lead to admissible evidence, but rather represent an attempt by Defense counsel to get a look at Plaintiffs' counsel's "play book." There is nothing relevant or likely to be relevant about what Plaintiffs' counsel thinks of the information Defendants seek to obtain.

It is a violation of the public policy set forth in California *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2018.020 for Plaintiff to identify information Plaintiffs' counsel has gathered that relate to the issues in the case. California *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2018.020 provides:

It is the policy of the state to do both of the following:

- (a) Preserve the rights of attorneys to prepare cases for trial with that degree of privacy necessary to encourage them to prepare their cases thoroughly and to investigate not only the favorable but the unfavorable aspects of those cases.
- (b) Prevent attorneys from taking undue advantage of their adversary's industry and efforts.

Defendant's are seeking materials and information that plaintiffs' counsel have gathered using their own industry and efforts to support their clients' claims. Some of the requested information is equally available to defendants, especially those requests that ask plaintiffs' counsel to identify and produce documents in defendant's own files. (for example, evidence of sales between McKesson and Wal-Mart). As will be demonstrated below, these interrogatories seek to obtain the thoughts and impressions of plaintiffs' counsel and the fruit of plaintiffs' counsel's labor, all in violation of the public policy set forth in California *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2018.020.

1 Therefore, plaintiffs cannot be forced to identify or provide the requested information and materials  
2 that their attorneys have gathered.

3 Code of Civil Procedure, Section 2018.030, provides: "Any writing that reflects an attorney's  
4 impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories, shall not be discoverable under any  
5 circumstances." The issue before this Court is whether the requested documents and information  
6 consist of attorney work product. "The statute, however, does not define 'work product'. Thus, the  
7 determination of what work product is must be resolved by individual court determinations on a case  
8 by case basis." (*City of Long Beach v. Superior Court* (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 65, 71.) What an  
9 attorney has learned or thinks is important in preparing the case is totally outside of the scope and  
10 objectives of legitimate discovery. The Supreme Court in *Hickman v. Taylor* (1947) 329 U.S. 495,  
11 511 recognized that a lawyer in preparing the client's case, assembles information, sifts through what  
12 the lawyer considers to be relevant facts, prepares legal theories and plans strategy. This work is  
13 reflected in tangible and intangible ways and is called work product. (*Id.*; see *In re Jeanette H.* (1990)  
14 225 Cal.App.3d 25, 32.) The Court explained the policy reasons for the attorney work product  
15 privilege:

16 Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is  
17 now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts,  
18 heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp  
19 practices would inevitable develop in the giving of legal advice and in the  
20 preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be  
21 demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be  
22 poorly served. . . . [T]he general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney's  
23 course of preparation is so well recognized and so essential to an orderly working  
24 of our system of legal procedure that a burden rests on the one who would invade  
25 that privacy to establish adequate reasons to justify production. (*Id.* at 511-512  
(emphasis added).)

26 Whether a request that a party identify and produce information and documents that counsel  
27 believes are relevant to the issues in this case violates the work product rule was addressed in *Nacht*  
28 & *Lewis Architects, Inc. v Superior Court* (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 214 and *City of Long Beach v.*  
*Superior Court* (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 65.

26 In *Nacht & Lewis Architects, Inc., supra*, 47 Cal.App.4th at 217 the trial court granted an  
27 order requiring the defendant to identify all persons who had been interviewed by the defendant or  
28 anyone acting on its behalf. The defendant objected to Form Interrogatory No. 12.2, stating that

1 interviews had been conducted but identification of the witnesses was protected by the attorney-client  
 2 privilege and work product doctrine. (*Id.*) The Court of Appeal held that requiring the defendant to  
 3 provide a list of witnesses interviewed would violate the absolute work product privilege of Section  
 4 2018(c), now Section 2018.030. (*Id.*) That court held as follows:

5           Compelled production of a list of potential witnesses interviewed by  
 6           opposing counsel would necessarily reflect counsel's evaluation of the case  
 7           by revealing which witnesses or persons who claimed knowledge of the  
           incident (already identified by defendants' response to interrogatory No. 12.1)  
           counsel deemed important enough to interview. (*Id.*)

8           In *City of Long Beach v. Superior Court* (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 65 the plaintiff served  
 9 interrogatories seeking the names and address of non-expert witnesses the defendant intended to call  
 10 at trial and sought the nature of the testimony of each witness. (*Id.* at 69.) The court specifically held  
 11 that requiring the defendant to disclose the identity of the witnesses it intended to call was qualified  
 12 work product. (*Id.* at 73.) The court further held that the anticipated testimony was absolutely  
 13 privileged as work product. (*Id.* at 80.)

14           Plaintiffs' counsel's selection and/or collection of information that counsel deems important  
 15 to the lawsuit or "supports his clients' contentions" is also protected work product. In cases  
 16 involving extensive document discovery, the selection and compilation of documents is often more  
 17 crucial than legal research. (*Shelton v. American Motors Corp.*, 805 F.2d 1323 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1986)(citing  
 18 *James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co.*, 93 F.R.D. 138, 144 (D.Del.1982).)) "Even if the individual  
 19 documents sought are not attorney work product, 'the selection process itself represents defense  
 20 counsel's mental impressions and legal opinions as to how the evidence in the documents relates  
 21 to the issues and defenses in the litigation.'" (*Smith v. Florida Power & Light Co.*, 632 So.2d 696,  
 22 698 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)(citing *Sporck v. Peil*, 759 F.2d 312, 315 (3d Cir. 1985).)) The selection  
 23 and compilation of documents by counsel falls within the highly-protected category of opinion  
 24 work product. (*Sporck v. Peil*, 759 F.2d 312, 315 (3d Cir. 1985).) Thus, regardless of the  
 25 jurisdiction, it is clear that in the practice of law, the selection and compilation of documents is  
 26 attorney work product that is not discoverable.

27           In the instant case, the Defendants ask that Plaintiffs' counsel be required to review their files  
 28 and tell defendant which documents plaintiffs' counsel think support Plaintiffs' claim, think are



important, why Plaintiffs' counsel believes they are important, or that Plaintiffs' counsel might use at trial. These interrogatories violate the absolute work product privilege in that they improperly seek "an attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories." (C.C.P. §2030.030.) An answer to these interrogatories will not clarify Plaintiffs' contentions, provide Defendants with facts, or narrow the issues. (See, e.g., *Sheets v. Superior Court* (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 1, 13). Rather, these interrogatories are asking Plaintiff to perform qualitative analysis and research for the Defendants. (See *id.*) However, Plaintiffs' counsel's selection, review, understanding, and compilation of facts and documents is attorney work product. Any facts and documents that Plaintiffs' counsel have gathered have been a result of a number of hours of work. Defendants should not benefit from the research that plaintiffs' counsel have done.

**Request for Production No. 9:**

All DOCUMENTS supporting YOUR contention that MCKESSON is a proper party to this lawsuit.

(For the purposes of this set of requests, "MCKESSON" means McKesson Corporation and any subsidiary or division thereof.)

**Plaintiffs' Response to Request for Production No. 9:**

Objection: This request seeks plaintiffs' counsel's work product, legal reasoning, theory, and/or statutory basis supporting a factual contention. Further, all responsive DOCUMENTS should be in the possession, custody or control of Defendants.

**Defendant's Reasons to Compel Further Response to Request for Prod. No. 9:**

Defendant preliminarily notes that, in a good faith effort to avoid this motion to compel, Defendant re-worded Request No. 9 in the meet and confer letter Defendant sent to Plaintiffs as follows:

**Request No. 9:** Please produce all DOCUMENTS relied on for YOUR contention that MCKESSON is a proper party to this lawsuit.

Plaintiffs, however, have not responded to Defendant's meet and confer letter or its modified Request for Production number 9. (*Holl Dec.*, at ¶6). The requested documents are discoverable, and Defendant is entitled to them.

Please see the reasons set forth above with respect to Request No. 3, and with respect to Interrogatory No. 12.

**Reason Why a Further Response Should Not Be Compelled:**

Please see the reasons set forth above with respect to Request No. 3, and with respect to Interrogatory No. 12.

**Request for Production No. 12:**

All DOCUMENTS supporting YOUR contention that the CHILDREN'S MOTRIN was sold by MCKESSON.

**Plaintiffs' Response to. Request for Production No. 12:**

Objection: This interrogatory seeks plaintiffs' counsel's work product, legal reasoning, theory, and/or statutory basis supporting a factual contention. Further, all responsive DOCUMENTS should be in the possession, custody or control of Defendants.

**Defendant's. Reasons to Compel Further Response to Request for Prod. No. 12:**

Defendant preliminarily notes that, in a good faith effort to avoid this motion to compel, Defendant re-worded Request No. 12 in the meet and confer letter Defendant sent to Plaintiffs as follows:

**Request No. 12:** Please produce all DOCUMENTS relied on for YOUR contention that the Children's Motrin was sold by MCKESSON.

Plaintiffs, however, have not responded to Defendant's meet and confer letter or its modified Request for Production number 12. (*Holl Dec.*, at ¶6). The requested documents are discoverable, and Defendant is entitled to them.

Please see the reasons set forth above with respect to Request No. 3, and with respect to Interrogatory No. 12.



**Reason Why a Further Response Should Not Be Compelled:**

Please see the reasons set forth above with respect to Request No. 3, and with respect to Interrogatory No. 12.

**III.****PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE**

**DEFENDANT'S POSITION:** Plaintiffs did not serve signed and verified response to Defendant's First Set of Form Interrogatories as required by C.C.P. § 2030.260(a), (c). The Court should issue an order compelling Plaintiffs to do so.

**PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE:** Plaintiffs timely served signed and verified responses to the requested discovery on February 9, 2007. Defendants have chosen to ignore the fact that they were mailed Exhibits 2-5, and instead focus on the fact that as a courtesy Plaintiffs also e-mailed them a copy of the discovery on February 12, 2007. E-mail service is not proper service under CCP § 1013, and e-mailing discovery responses on February 12, 2007 certainly does not invalidate responses that were sent out on February 9, 2007 via mail and according to code.

**Form Interrogatory No. 17.1:**

Is your response to each request for admission served with these interrogatories an unqualified admission? If not, for each response that is not an unqualified admission:

- (a) state the number of the request;
- (b) state all facts upon which you base your response;
- (c) state the names, ADDRESSES, and telephone numbers of all PERSONS who have knowledge of those facts; and
- (d) identify all DOCUMENTS and other tangible things that support your response and state the name, ADDRESS, and telephone number of the PERSON who has each DOCUMENT or thing.

**Plaintiffs' Response to Form Interrogatory No. 17.1:**

No.

- (a) Requests No. One and No. Two;

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1 (b) Plaintiffs purchased the CHILDREN'S MOTRIN from WAL-MART;  
2 (c) Plaintiffs;  
3 (d) Despite a diligent search and reasonable inquiry, plaintiffs are unable to identify any  
4 DOCUMENTS in their possession which would be responsive to this request.

5  
6 (a) Requests No. Three and No. Four;

7 (b)(c)(d) Objection: This interrogatory seeks plaintiffs' counsel's work product, legal  
8 reasoning, theory, and/or statutory basis supporting a factual contention.

9 **Defendant's Reasons to Compel Further Response to Form Interrogatory No. 17.1:**

10 In response to Requests for Admission numbers 3 and 4, Plaintiffs deny, respectively, that  
11 the Children's Motrin at issue in this case was not sold by McKesson and that the Plaintiffs have no  
12 evidence of any such sale. (*See Holl Dec. Ex. I* at response numbers 3 and 4). Plaintiffs object to  
13 providing details concerning these denials in Form Interrogatory No. 17.1 on the basis that the  
14 interrogatory seeks protected information.

15 Please see the reasons set forth above with respect to Interrogatory No. 12. Defendant is  
16 entitled to learn the facts upon which Plaintiffs' denials were made, the identity of the people with  
17 knowledge of the facts, and documents supporting the denial.  
18 identity of the people with knowledge of the facts, and documents supporting the denial.

19 **Reason Why a Further Response Should Not Be Compelled:**

20 Please see the reasons set forth above with respect to Request No. 3, and with respect to  
21 Interrogatory No. 12.

22 **IV.**

23 **PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION, SET ONE**


24 **DEFENDANT'S POSITION:** Plaintiffs did not serve signed and verified response to  
25 Defendant's First Set of Requests for Admission as required by C.C.P. § 2033.240(a), (c). The Court  
26 should issue an order compelling Plaintiffs to do so.

27 **PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE:** Plaintiffs timely served signed and verified responses to the  
28 requested discovery on February 9, 2007. Defendants have chosen to ignore the fact that they were

1 mailed Exhibits 2-5, and instead focus on the fact that as a courtesy Plaintiffs also e-mailed them a  
2 copy of the discovery on February 12, 2007. E-mail service is not proper service under CCP § 1013, a  
3 and e-mailing discovery responses on February 12, 2007 certainly does not invalidate responses that  
4 were sent out on February 9, 2007 via mail and according to code.  
5

6 DATED: April 24, 2007

GREENE BROILLET & WHEELER, LLP

7   
8

9 Michael J. Avenatti, Esq.  
10 Alan Van Gelder, Esq.  
11 Attorneys for Plaintiff  
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**PROOF OF SERVICE**  
**(C.C.P. 1013A, 2015.5)**

**STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

I am employed in the county of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action; my business address is 100 Wilshire Boulevard, 21st Floor, Santa Monica, California 90401.

On April 24, 2007, I served the foregoing document, described as

**PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT JOHNSON & JOHNSON'S SEPARATE  
STATEMENT OF ITEMS IN DISPUTE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL  
FURTHER RESPONSES**

on the interested parties in this action

\_\_\_ by placing the true copies thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as stated on the attached mailing list.

X by placing \_\_\_ the original X a true copy enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as follows:

**\_\_\_ BY MAIL.**

\_\_\_ I deposited such envelope in the mail at Santa Monica, California. The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid.

\_\_\_ As follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. postal service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Santa Monica, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

Executed on April 24, 2007, at Santa Monica, California.

**\_\_\_ BY PERSONAL SERVICE.** I delivered such envelope by hand to the offices of the addressee.

**\_\_\_ BY FACSIMILE.** I faxed a copy of the above-described document to the interested parties as set forth [above/on the attached mailing list].

Executed on April 24, 2007 at Santa Monica, California.

**X BY FEDERAL EXPRESS (PRIORITY OVERNIGHT).** I caused to be deposited such envelope in the Federal Express Depository at Santa Monica, California.

Executed on April 24, 2007 at Santa Monica, California.

X (State) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

**Robert Gersten**  
Name

  
Signature

SERVICE LIST  
*GAINES v. JOHNSON & JOHNSON*  
San Francisco Superior Case No. CGC 06 457600

**BY FEDERAL EXPRESS**

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Thomas W. Pulliam, Jr., Esq.  
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NEIL CONSUMER AND SPECIALTY  
PHARMACEUTICALS, a Division of  
McNEIL-PPC, INC.) McKESSON  
CORPORATION, and WAL-MART STORES,  
INC.

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9 Attorneys for Defendants

10 JOHNSON & JOHNSON, MCNEIL CONSUMER  
11 HEALTHCARE, a Division of MCNEIL-PPC, INC.  
12 (erroneously sued as MCNEIL CONSUMER &  
13 SPECIALTY PHARMACEUTICALS,  
14 a Division of MCNEIL-PPC, INC.), MCKESSON  
15 CORPORATION, and WAL-MART STORES, INC.

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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

13 THOMAS B. GAINES, a deceased minor  
14 child by and through his personal  
15 representative(s) and/or successor(s) in  
16 interest; DIANA L. GAINES, individually,  
17 as Executor of the Estate of Thomas B.  
18 Gaines, and as Thomas B. Gaines' personal  
19 representative and successor in interest;  
20 GARY D. GAINES, individually and as  
21 Thomas B. Gaines' personal representative  
22 and successor in interest; and THE  
23 ESTATE OF THOMAS B. GAINES,

24 Plaintiffs,

25 v.

26 JOHNSON & JOHNSON, a New Jersey  
27 corporation; MCNEIL CONSUMER &  
28 SPECIALTY PHARMACEUTICALS, a  
Division of MCNEIL-PPC, INC., a New  
Jersey corporation; MCKESSON  
CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation;  
WAL-MART STORES, INC., a Delaware  
corporation; and DOES 1 through 100,  
inclusive,

Defendants.

ENDORSED  
FILED

San Francisco County Superior Court

APR 30 2007

GORDON PARK-LI, Clerk

BY: MARYANN MORGAN  
Deputy Clerk

Case No: CGC-06-457600

DEFENDANT JOHNSON &  
JOHNSON'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS'  
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S  
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY

Date: May 7, 2007  
Time: 10:30 a.m.  
Place: Department 610  
Judge: Commissioner Bruce E. Chan

Complaint Filed: November 3, 2006

BY FAX



**I.  
INTRODUCTION**

Defendant Johnson & Johnson ("Defendant") respectfully submits the following reply to Plaintiffs' opposition to Defendant's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Defendant's First Set of Special Interrogatories, First Request for Production, First Set of Form Interrogatories, and First Set of Requests for Admissions.

**II.  
ARGUMENT**

**A. Defendant No Longer Claims That Plaintiffs' Responses Were Untimely**

Subsequent to the filing of this Motion, Plaintiffs' counsel informed Defendant that Plaintiffs had timely mailed signed and verified discovery responses to Defendant on February 9, 2007. Plaintiffs thereafter provided Defendant with copies of the discovery responses which contained proofs of service that indicated that the responses were timely mailed on February 9, 2007. Defendant never received these mailed discovery responses. Nevertheless, Defendant withdraws its claim that Plaintiffs' discovery responses were untimely, and its request for an order compelling Plaintiffs to provide signatures and verifications for the discovery responses.

**B. Plaintiffs' Work-Product Objections To Defendant's Interrogatories And Request For Production Are Without Merit**

Defendant's Special Interrogatories numbers 12 and 13 asked Plaintiffs to "set forth all facts" and "describe all evidence," respectively, supporting their contention that McKesson is a proper party to this lawsuit. Special Interrogatories numbers 18 and 19 asked Plaintiffs to "set forth all facts" and "describe all evidence," respectively, supporting their contention that McKesson sold Children's Motrin. Defendant's Form Interrogatory number 17.1 asked Plaintiffs to "state all facts" upon which Plaintiffs based any denials to Defendant's Requests for Admission. Request for Production numbers 3, 9 and 12 sought documents supporting Plaintiffs' above-mentioned contentions.

These interrogatories and requests for production are clearly proper. In "California, discovery proceedings provide a most important method of obtaining



1 knowledge of such facts as may exist and on which the protagonist relies." *Singer v.*  
 2 *Superior Court* (1960) 54 Cal. 2d 318, 324. "There is no doubt that a defendant is  
 3 entitled to discover by appropriate interrogatories the facts, if any, presently known to the  
 4 plaintiff upon which he bases the allegations of his complaint and upon which he  
 5 presently relies to prove his case." *Sheets v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County*  
 6 (1967) 257 Cal. App. 2d 1, 8-9; *see also Burke v. Superior Court* (1969) 71 Cal. 2d 276,  
 7 281-285 (standing for the proposition that a party is entitled to interrogatories disclosing  
 8 the facts, if any, known to his opponent and upon which the opponent presently relies to  
 9 prove his case). To be sure, "[t]he classic interrogatory is: 'Please state what fact or facts  
 10 form the basis for the allegations set forth in....'" *Conn v. National Can Corp.* (1981) 124  
 11 Cal. App. 3d 630, 639. Furthermore, document requests seeking facts or documents  
 12 relied upon by parties in support of their contentions are commonplace and appropriate.  
 13 *See, e.g., Burke v. Superior Court* (1969) 71 Cal. 2d 276, 280-281; *Rifkind v. Superior*  
 14 *Court* (1994) 22 Cal. App. 4th 1255, 1260-1261; and cases cited therein. A party is  
 15 unquestionably entitled to discovery of the opponent's contentions and their factual and  
 16 evidentiary bases, notwithstanding the underlying involvement of expert opinion or  
 17 attorney analysis. *Ibid.*

18 Form Interrogatory number 17.1 and Special Interrogatories numbers 12-13 and  
 19 18-19 do not seek Plaintiffs' or Plaintiffs' counsels' contentions, legal arguments,  
 20 conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories. *See, e.g., Flora Crane Service, Inc.*  
 21 *v. Superior Court* (1965) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 781. Rather, these interrogatories call  
 22 upon Plaintiffs to state the "facts" and "evidence" underlying Plaintiffs' contentions as  
 23 set forth in their Complaint. It has been long settled that questions relating to the facts  
 24 underlying the contentions of the parties are proper and must be answered. *Singer, supra*,  
 25 54 Cal. 2d 318. Similarly, Defendant's Request for Production numbers 3, 9 and 12 are  
 26 limited to documents relied on by Plaintiffs for their contentions as set forth in their  
 27 Complaint. The requests do not seek Plaintiffs' or Plaintiffs' counsels' contentions, legal  
 28 arguments, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories.

1 Thus, Plaintiffs' work-product objections, on the ground that Defendant's  
 2 interrogatories and request for production seek counsel's impressions, conclusions,  
 3 opinions, or legal research or theories, are clearly meritless.

4 **C. Plaintiffs' Substantive Responses To Defendant's Special Interrogatories Are**  
 5 **Wholly Insufficient**

6 Plaintiffs responses to Special Interrogatories numbers 12-13 and 18-19 are  
 7 substantively incomplete and insufficient. Plaintiffs responded to each of these  
 8 interrogatories with the same conclusionary assertion that "McKesson was and is the  
 9 distributor of Children's Motrin to Wal-Mart." This response is wholly inadequate. It  
 10 does not fully provide the "facts" and "evidence" underlying Plaintiffs' contentions that  
 11 McKesson sold Children's Motrin and that McKesson is a proper party to this lawsuit.  
 12 Defendant is entitled to complete and substantive responses to these interrogatories.

13 **D. Plaintiffs Have Not Provided Supplemental Discovery Responses**

14 Plaintiffs have not provided Defendant with supplemental responses to  
 15 Defendant's discovery, despite Plaintiffs' claim to the contrary. While Plaintiffs claim  
 16 that they "provided supplemental responses in the form of news stories outlining the  
 17 substantial distribution relationship between Wal-Mart and McKesson," an email from  
 18 Plaintiffs' counsel to Defendant's counsel containing an attachment with news articles is  
 19 not a proper supplemental response. (Declaration of Thomas W. Pulliam, at ¶¶ 4, 7).  
 20 Defendant is entitled to a signed and verified response. See C.C.P. §§ 2030.250(a), (c)  
 21 (interrogatories), 2031.250(a), (c) (request for production), and 2033.240(a), (c) (requests  
 22 for admission). Additionally, if these news stories constitute the totality of Plaintiffs'  
 23 evidence of McKesson's liability, Defendant is entitled to a verified response saying  
 24 exactly that.

25 **III.**  
 26 **CONCLUSION**

27 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant requests that its Motion to Compel be  
 28 ///

1 granted.

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3 Dated: April 30, 2007

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DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP

 For  
BENJAMIN J. HOLL

Attorneys for Defendants  
JOHNSON & JOHNSON, MCNEIL  
CONSUMER HEALTHCARE, a Division  
of MCNEIL-PPC, INC. (erroneously sued  
as MCNEIL CONSUMER & SPECIALTY  
PHARMACEUTICALS, a Division of  
MCNEIL-PPC, INC.), MCKESSON  
CORPORATION, and WAL-MART  
STORES, INC.

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, GLORIA CADENA, declare that:

I am at least 18 years of age, and not a party to the above-entitled action. My business address is 50 Fremont Street, 20th Floor, San Francisco, California 94105, Telephone: (415) 591-7500.

On April 30, 2007, I caused to be served the following document(s):

**DEFENDANT JOHNSON & JOHNSON'S REPLY TO  
PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S  
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY**


by enclosing a true copy of (each of) said document(s) in (an) envelope(s), addressed as follows:

- ☒ BY MAIL: I am readily familiar with the business' practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. I know that the correspondence is deposited with the United States Postal Service on the same day this declaration was executed in the ordinary course of business. I know that the envelope was sealed, and with postage thereon fully prepaid, placed for collection and mailing on this date, following ordinary business practices, in the United States mail at San Francisco, California.
- ☐ BY PERSONAL SERVICE: I caused such envelopes to be delivered by a messenger service by hand to the address(es) listed below:
- ☐ BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY: I enclosed a true copy of said document(s) in a Federal Express envelope, addressed as follows:
- ☐ BY FACSIMILE: I caused such documents to be transmitted by facsimile transmission and mail as indicated above.

Michael J. Avenatti, Esq.  
GREENE BROILLET & WHEELER  
100 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 2100  
Santa Monica, CA 90401  
Telephone: (310) 576-1200  
Facsimile: (310) 576-1220  
*Counsel for Plaintiffs*

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on April 30, 2007 at San Francisco, California.

  
GLORIA CADENA

CHARLES F. PREUSS (State Bar No. 45783)  
 THOMAS W. PULLIAM, JR. (State Bar No. 46322)  
 BENJAMIN J. HOLL (State Bar No. 200630)  
 DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP  
 50 Fremont Street, 20th Floor  
 San Francisco, California 94105-2235  
 Telephone: (415) 591-7500  
 Facsimile: (415) 591-7510

ENDORSED  
 FILED  
 San Francisco County Superior Court  
 APR 30 2007  
 GORDON PARK-LI, Clerk  
 BY: MARY ANN MORAN  
 Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Defendants  
 JOHNSON & JOHNSON, MCNEIL CONSUMER  
 HEALTHCARE, a Division of MCNEIL-PPC, INC.  
 (erroneously sued as MCNEIL CONSUMER &  
 SPECIALTY PHARMACEUTICALS,  
 a Division of MCNEIL-PPC, INC.), MCKESSON  
 CORPORATION, and WAL-MART STORES, INC.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
 FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

THOMAS B. GAINES, a deceased minor  
 child by and through his personal  
 representative(s) and/or successor(s) in  
 interest; DIANA L. GAINES, individually,  
 as Executor of the Estate of Thomas B.  
 Gaines, and as Thomas B. Gaines' personal  
 representative and successor in interest;  
 GARY D. GAINES, individually and as  
 Thomas B. Gaines' personal representative  
 and successor in interest; and THE  
 ESTATE OF THOMAS B. GAINES,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON, a New Jersey  
 corporation; MCNEIL CONSUMER &  
 SPECIALTY PHARMACEUTICALS, a  
 Division of MCNEIL-PPC, INC., a New  
 Jersey corporation; MCKESSON  
 CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation;  
 WAL-MART STORES, INC., a Delaware  
 corporation; and DOES 1 through 100,  
 inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. CGC-06-457600

DECLARATION OF THOMAS W.  
 PULLIAM, JR. IN SUPPORT OF  
 DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO  
 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO  
 DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO  
 COMPEL DISCOVERY

Date: May 7, 2007  
 Time: 10:30 a.m.  
 Place: Department 610  
 Judge: Commissioner Bruce E. Chan

Complaint Filed: November 3, 2006

BY FAX

///

DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP  
 50 Fremont Street, 20th Floor  
 San Francisco, CA 94105



1 I, THOMAS W. PULLIAM, declare that:

2 1. I am a partner in Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, which represents the  
3 Defendant in this action. The information in this declaration is based upon my personal  
4 knowledge and best recollection.

5 2. On or about April 24, Plaintiffs' counsel, Michael Avenatti, called me  
6 requesting that Defendant's motion to compel be continued from May 7 to May 14  
7 because a schedule conflict had arisen for him and because he thought we should be able  
8 to "work out" the issues which were the subject of the motion.

9 3. We discussed the motion and I told Mr. Avenatti that I had not drafted the  
10 motion and had not paid much attention to it since before it was filed. I told Mr. Avenatti  
11 that he should contact Ben Holl, the attorney who is handling the motion. I also told Mr.  
12 Avenatti that Ben was on vacation the week of April 23, but that I would leave Ben a  
13 message regarding this and get back to Mr. Avenatti.

14 4. We continued to discuss the subject matter of the motion. I told Mr.  
15 Avenatti that my recollection of the motion was that we wanted all of the evidence upon  
16 which Plaintiffs based their allegations that McKesson was liable to Plaintiffs in this  
17 action (i.e. that McKesson had sold the Children's Motrin at issue to Wal-Mart). Mr.  
18 Avenatti reminded me that he had sent me an email on April 10 containing an attachment  
19 of some printed information obtained from the internet (and perhaps from the media),  
20 which described the relationship between McKesson and Wal-Mart. I told Mr. Avenatti  
21 that I remembered the information, but that it made no reference to Children's Motrin. I  
22 told him we simply wanted responses to our discovery and that if that printed information  
23 was all of the evidence requested in the discovery, Plaintiffs should say so in responses.


24 5. Mr. Avenatti proposed that if we would continue the motion from May 7 to  
25 May 14, he would provide amended responses by April 27. I told him I would check  
26 with Ben Holl and get back to him.

27 6. I left a voicemail message for Ben Holl. We also contacted the court to  
28

1 find out whether the motion could be continued from May 7 to May 14. We were told  
2 that the earliest date to which the motion could be continued was May 30. When I did  
3 not hear from Ben Holl, I sent Mr. Avenatti an email around noon on April 24 telling him  
4 (a) I had not heard from Ben, (b) we could not continue the motion to May 14 - the  
5 earliest date would be May 30, (c) we did not want to wait that long, and (d) if he  
6 provided us everything we asked for in the motion we would have no reason to keep it on  
7 calendar.

8 7. Mr. Avenatti responded to my email with an email a few minutes later  
9 saying that plaintiffs would file an opposition to the motion to compel. As of the date of  
10 this declaration, Plaintiffs have not provided Defendant with supplemental responses to  
11 the discovery at issue in this motion.

12  
13 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of California the  
14 forgoing is true and correct and is executed at San Francisco, California on April30, 2007.

15  
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18 THOMAS W. PULLIAM, JR.  
19 Declarant  
20  
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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, GLORIA CADENA, declare that:

I am at least 18 years of age, and not a party to the above-entitled action. My business address is 50 Fremont Street, 20th Floor, San Francisco, California 94105, Telephone: (415) 591-7500.

On April 30, 2007, I caused to be served the following document(s):

**DECLARATION OF THOMAS W. PULLIAM, JR. IN  
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JOHNSON & JOHNSON'S  
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO  
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY**

by enclosing a true copy of (each of) said document(s) in (an) envelope(s), addressed as follows:

- ☒ BY MAIL: I am readily familiar with the business' practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. I know that the correspondence is deposited with the United States Postal Service on the same day this declaration was executed in the ordinary course of business. I know that the envelope was sealed, and with postage thereon fully prepaid, placed for collection and mailing on this date, following ordinary business practices, in the United States mail at San Francisco, California.
- ☐ BY PERSONAL SERVICE: I caused such envelopes to be delivered by a messenger service by hand to the address(es) listed below:
- ☐ BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY: I enclosed a true copy of said document(s) in a Federal Express envelope, addressed as follows:
- ☐ BY FACSIMILE: I caused such documents to be transmitted by facsimile transmission and mail as indicated above.

Michael J. Avenatti, Esq.  
GREENE BROILLET & WHEELER  
100 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 2100  
Santa Monica, CA 90401  
Telephone: (310) 576-1200  
Facsimile: (310) 576-1220  
*Counsel for Plaintiffs*

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on April 30, 2007 at San Francisco, California.

  
GLORIA CADENA

1 CHARLES F. PREUSS (State Bar No. 45783)  
2 THOMAS W. PULLIAM, JR. (State Bar No. 46322)  
3 BENJAMIN J. HOLL (State Bar No. 200630)  
4 DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP  
5 50 Fremont Street, 20th Floor  
6 San Francisco, California 94105-2235  
7 Telephone: (415) 591-7500  
8 Facsimile: (415) 591-7510

9 Attorneys for Defendants  
10 JOHNSON & JOHNSON, MCNEIL CONSUMER  
11 HEALTHCARE, a Division of MCNEIL-PPC, INC.  
12 (erroneously sued as MCNEIL CONSUMER &  
13 SPECIALTY PHARMACEUTICALS,  
14 a Division of MCNEIL-PPC, INC.), MCKESSON  
15 CORPORATION, and WAL-MART STORES, INC.

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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

THOMAS B. GAINES, a deceased minor  
child by and through his personal  
representative(s) and/or successor(s) in  
interest; DIANA L. GAINES, individually,  
as Executor of the Estate of Thomas B.  
Gaines, and as Thomas B. Gaines' personal  
representative and successor in interest;  
GARY D. GAINES, individually and as  
Thomas B. Gaines' personal representative  
and successor in interest; and THE  
ESTATE OF THOMAS B. GAINES,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON, a New Jersey  
corporation; MCNEIL CONSUMER &  
SPECIALTY PHARMACEUTICALS, a  
Division of MCNEIL-PPC, INC., a New  
Jersey corporation; MCKESSON  
CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation;  
WAL-MART STORES, INC., a Delaware  
corporation; and DOES 1 through 100,  
inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. CGC-06-457600

**DEFENDANT JOHNSON &  
JOHNSON'S NOTICE OF TAKING  
MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY  
OFF CALENDAR**

Date: May 7, 2007  
Time: 10:30 a.m.  
Place: Department 610  
Judge: Commissioner Bruce E. Chan

Complaint Filed: November 3, 2006

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DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP  
50 Fremont Street, 20th Floor  
San Francisco, CA 94105

SF13836401

DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF TAKING MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OFF CALENDAR

1 TO THE COURT, PLAINTIFFS, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:  
 2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Civil Local Rule 8.2B, Defendant Johnson &  
 3 Johnson ("Defendant") is taking off calendar its Motion to Compel Further Responses to  
 4 Defendant's First Set of Special Interrogatories, First Request for Production, First Set of  
 5 Form Interrogatories, and First Set of Requests for Admissions. The hearing on the  
 6 Motion was noticed for hearing on May 7, 2007 at 10:30 a.m. in department 610 of the  
 7 above captioned court. Defendant's taking the Motion off calendar is without prejudice  
 8 to its re-noticing the Motion for hearing in compliance with CCP section 1005.

9  
 10 Dated: May 4, 2007

DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP

11   
 12 BENJAMIN J. HOLL

13 Attorneys for Defendants  
 14 JOHNSON & JOHNSON, MCNEIL  
 15 CONSUMER HEALTHCARE, a Division  
 16 of MCNEIL-PPC, INC. (erroneously sued  
 17 as MCNEIL CONSUMER & SPECIALTY  
 18 PHARMACEUTICALS, a Division of  
 19 MCNEIL-PPC, INC.), MCKESSON  
 20 CORPORATION, and WAL-MART  
 21 STORES, INC.

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I, Michelle Sankey, declare that:

I am at least 18 years of age, and not a party to the above-entitled action. My business address is 50 Fremont Street, 20th Floor, San Francisco, California 94105, Telephone: (415) 591-7500.

On May 4, 2007, I caused to be served the following document(s):

**DEFENDANTS' JOHNSON & JOHNSON'S NOTICE OF  
TAKING MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY OFF  
CALENDAR**

by enclosing a true copy of (each of) said document(s) in (an) envelope(s), addressed as follows:



BY MAIL: I am readily familiar with the business' practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. I know that the correspondence is deposited with the United States Postal Service on the same day this declaration was executed in the ordinary course of business. I know that the envelope was sealed, and with postage thereon fully prepaid, placed for collection and mailing on this date, following ordinary business practices, in the United States mail at San Francisco, California.



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Michael J. Avenatti, Esq.  
GREENE BROILLET & WHEELER  
100 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 2100  
Santa Monica, CA 90401  
Telephone: (310) 576-1200  
Facsimile: (310) 576-1220  
*Counsel for Plaintiffs*

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on May 4, 2007 at San Francisco, California.

  
MICHELLE SANKEY